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The Current and Possible Future Role of the Canadian Import
Tribunal in the North American Competitive Context
by Robert J. Bertrand*
M

y

purpose with this paper is to compare and contrast the functioning
and roles of the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) and
the Canadian Import Tribunal in our two competitive North American
economies. I intend to consider their roles, both in a possibly more open
international trading environment-which may develop in the medium
term if there is a return to a greater degree of order in the international
monetary and financial systems, coupled with some positive, liberalizing
arrangements to be negotiated in the Uruguay Round-and in a possibly
more open trade regime organized by Canada and the United States on a
bilateral basis. It has been widely speculated that the bilateral talks
could significantly modify the anti-dumping and countervailing duty systems as they apply to trade between our two countries. I hasten to add
that I am not involved in any way in these discussions looking to a special arrangement. I feel I can comment on that issue, as it touches on the
future roles of our two tribunals, entirely as an outsider.
It is important to understand that the USITC and the Canadian Import Tribunal (I do not use the abbreviations because I understand that
in the United States, CIT stands for your Court of International Trade)
do not have identical assignments. Your ITC 1 has a wide range of functions, some of which, in Canada, are not assigned to the Import Tribunal.
As I understand it, the USITC, under various enactments has a mandate
to carry out investigations and make reports, on the potential economic
effects of potential concessions in international negotiations. The ITC
also carries out investigations, at the request of Congress or the President, into production and trade trends in a wide range of industries, or
dealing with important developments in trade. For example, in 1982 the
ITC published the result of a broad economic inquiry into The Relationship of Exports in Selected U.S. Service Industries to U.S. Merchandise
Exports.2

In Canada, our Tribunal does not carry out such general inquiries
regarding potential international trade developments. The Government
* Chairman, Canadian Import Tribunal.

I have relied, as a useful summary, on the following the USITC study: JOHN M. DOBSON:
Two CENTURIES OF TARIFFS, THE BACKGROUND EMERGENCE OF THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL
TRADE COMMISSION, (USITC Pub. No.
1976).
2 USITC PUB. No. 1290, THE RELATIONSHIP OF EXPORTS IN SELECTED U.S. SERVICE INDUSTRIES TO U.S. MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (1982).
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of Canada is considering a reorganization of the Boards and Tribunals
which are charged with analyzing and adjudicating various trade matters. It may well be that a body similar to the ITC may emerge. But in
the present I will limit my comments to the existing arrangements. Our
Tribunal focuses on whether specified imports have caused or threatened
injury to Canadian producers. There is, however, a fairly broad authority in section 48 of our Special Import Measures Act for the government
to refer matters to the Tribunal for broad inquiry. Under their authority,
we have conducted detailed enquiries into the footwear industry and into
the steel industry. Canada has published less in the way of detailed sector-specific analysis of trade developments. This is an aspect of being a
small country with fewer resources available to apply to such inquiries.
The Tariff Board of Canada, which has been functioning for many
decades, was not unlike your Tariff Commission when it was first established in 1916. Our Tariff Board can hold hearings, make staff enquiries,
and make reports (which the Minister of Finance must table in the
House of Commons) as to the operation of the tariff structure in regard
to particular products, sectors, or tariff items. The very extensive detailed revision of our Customs Tariff schedules (both nomenclature and
rates) which has occasioned many re-negotiations with the United States
and others under Article XXVIII of the GATT, have been, almost invariably, the result of proposals made by the Tariff Board and only after
extensive public enquiry. In regard to such matters, Canada adopted or
copied the U.S. habit of addressing such issues by the technique of open
enquiry. Our Tariff Board also has a court-like function; it is to the
Board that appeals may be made from the decisions of our Department
of National Revenue (Customs and Excise) as to tariff classification,
value for duty, margin of dumping for the anti-dumping provisions, and
liability for the manufacturer's sales tax. The Board built up an extensive
body of jurisprudence over the years, in part because our tariff structure
was complicated and provided for different rates of duty for the same
product depending on whether or not it was held to be of a class (or kind)
"made in Canada" or whether or not it was imported for a particular
purpose. Appeals on issues of law can be made from tariff Board decisions to our Federal Court.
In 1984, when the Special Import Measures Act was prolmulgated,
the Tribunal was given the general function of enquiry into the impact on
domestic producers of unfairly traded imports or imports causing or
threatening serious injury. Traditionally, Canada has considered that the
whole issue of dealing with emergency situations, that is, with situations
in which action could be justified under GATT Article XIX, the socalled safeguard or escape clause provision, should be as an in-house
matter by officials advising ministers confidentially. Hence, no provision
was made for public hearing and inquiry in regard to such matters. Prior
to the Kennedy Round, Canada had no provision for public inquiry into
the alleged injurious impact of dumped imports. There was a compli-

Bertrand-ROLE OF THE CANADIAN IMPORT TRIBUNAL

cated series of statutory and regulatory tests in regard to the application
of our anti-dumping system, which was introduced in 1904 as an alternative to a general increase in tariffs against dumping by foreign cartels and
monopolies-mainly from Germany and the United States. But there
was no requirement that there be an organized inquiry by an independent
agency. This role, so important for the USITC, had not been developed
in Canada, when, in 1967, we signed the Kennedy Round Anti-dumping
Code.
That Code involved an obligation to make systematic enquiry and to
hold hearings about possible injury caused by dumping. Accepting this
obligation was a major Canadian concession in the Kennedy Round, and
represented a very substantial overhaul of our legislation.' The Canadian
government concluded that the matter was so important that a new, separate and independent agency should be established to conduct injury
enquiries. The creation of what was at first called the Anti-dumping Tribunal, and, now, with the further revision of our legislation based on the
agreements negotiated in the Tokyo Round, the re-christened administrative tribunal called the Canadian Import Tribunal.
Some other differences in our two structures should be noted. A
major difference is the way in which the various issues which the USITC
deals with under section 337 of the U.S. Tariff Act are addressed. We do
not have, in Canada, a separate administrative body to deal with allegations of patent or trade mark infringement by importations. These are
dealt with by our courts in the same manner as allegations of infringement by domestic producers. We have not seen any need to provide any
different or less rigorous approach to adjudicating such issues. Indeed, it
remains the Canadian view that Article III of the GATT, which imposes
a far-ranging obligation to treat imports, aside from the imposition of the
agreed customs duty, no less favourably than domestic products, precludes us from treating such issues when imports are involved in any
different fashion than we do when it involves domestic products. (I am
aware that a GATT panel concluded otherwise.4 )
It seems to me that if a special bilateral arrangement is developed
between our two countries, this important difference in approach will
have to be examined.
Another difference, looking at the two administrative complexes, is
the manner of dealing with the clothing and textile sectors. In the
United States, you address these problems in-house, primarily by the use
of an inter-agency committee. Canada followed this same type of procedure until it decided in 1970 to set up an independent board which could
3 The legislation which enabled investigation in to the alleged injuries caused by dumping was
the Anti-dumping Act of 1968, R.S.C. ch. A-15 (1970), which has been revised and incorporated
into the Special Import Measures Act, R.S.C. ch. E-17 (1970).
4 The reference is to the so called Wallbank Case discussed in GATT, United States - Imports
of Certain Automotive Spring Assemblies, (L/5333); in BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND LEGAL DocuMENTS, at 107-28 (I GATT Supp. 30 1984) (report of the Panel adopted on May 26, 1983).
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hold hearings and make reports. It is this Board-the Textile and Clothing Board-which makes the recommendations which, if accepted by the
Ministers, lead to the negotiations with exporting countries as to the quotas they impose on exports to Canada. Alternatively, the Board may recommend that the Government make use of its rights under GATT
Article XIX. For these two special sectors which have been given special
access to safeguard procedures, it is the Textile and Clothing Board, not
the Import Tribunal, which makes the recommendations. 5
I have devoted some initial space to this essentially taxonomic exercise because it is important to understand that the USITC and our Import Tribunal do not have identical functions. In going on to consider
issues of substance, it is important to keep in mind this difference in
structure and assignment. There is, moreover, the important difference
that Canada has a Cabinet system of government, with responsibility
placed on elected Ministers who enjoy the confidence of the House of
Commons; thus, in the Canadian system there is less scope for initiative
and inquiry in the legislature. Our tribunals are either autonomous bodies making legal, quasi-judicial decisions (such as a ruling by our Tariff
Board on the amount of anti-dumping duty payable on a particular import, or a determination by the Import Tribunal that injury has been
caused by dumped imports) or they make recommendations to Ministers,
as does the USITC in an escape clause action. There is, however, no
detailed set of rules prescribing the various choices which the executive
arm of government may make (as in a U.S. escape clause case) nor is
there any provision for scrutiny by the legislature. The Canadian system,
in this area as in other areas, is more formalized and legalistic than is
normally the case in European countries, but less than is normally the
case in the United States.
As I have already observed, the various functions and assignments I
have described may be reshuffled: the Government has indicated that it
contemplates re-organizing the functions of the Tariff Board, the Textile
and Clothing Board, and the Import Tribunal. Clearly, in such a reorganization it will be prudent to consider possibly uniting the function
of inquiry into the impact on domestic producers of importations in some
other body along with the more adjudicatory functions of rulings on
tariff classification, value for duty, or sales tax, etc. These organizational
issues are presently being worked out.
Having said that, I can return to the theme proposed for me by the
organizers of this meeting: the potential functions and roles of the
USITC and our Import Tribunal (as it exists or may be modified) in the
emerging competitive North American environment. The central, key
function of the two institutions is to assess the impact on domestic producers caused by imports. Has material injury been caused, or has there
been a threat of material injury, to domestic producers by imports of
5 See Special Import Measures Act supra note 3, S. 103.
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dumped or subsidized goods? Has serious injury been caused to domestic producers by goods imported under the conditions specified in GATT
Article XIX - that is, in such increased quantities and under such conditions, and as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effects of the
obligations incurred ...under this Agreement. This key function is addressed in somewhat different terms, in a somewhat different fashion, by
the two tribunals. In assessing the potential roles of our two tribunals we
should identify and understand just the differences in interpretation of
key terms which we both employ in our domestic legislation under the
umbrella of the GATT.
There are two related concepts: injury and causation. In the U.S
tradition, as developed by the ITC in a number of decisions and, as I
understand it, supported by legislative history,6 injury is taken to refer to
the existence of a state of less than maximum well-being; measured by
prices, profits, and employment in the given industry. In the Canadian
practice, as developed in the Import Tribunal's findings and supported by
the words of our Statute and of the GATT and the relevant interpretative
agreements, we take the injury that is relevant to be that worsening of
conditions in the industry which is attributable to the dumping (or subsidization) at issue. We take injury in the sense of he did him an injury. It
refers to the existence of conditions in the industry which are attributable
to the dumping (or subsidization) at issue. Is there an injury directly
related to the dumping (or subsidization)? The fact that there may be
other adverse effects on the industry, other injuries which together make
an industry very ill is not the issue. Let me quote from a recent USITC
document to illustrate my proposition. In the additional views of Chairman Liebeler, in a recent determination it is stated that, "the Commission must determine whether the domestic industry producing the like
product is materially injured ...and whether any injury (emphasis added).., is by reason of the dumped or subsidized imports."7 We do not
read our statute (or the GATT, or the Tokyo Round agreements) in that
fashion. As we see it, our function under the law is to find whether the
injury found to be due solely to the dumping (or subsidization) is, by
itself, a material injury. It is apparent that our reading of our law is less
protectionist than that of the ITC. It might well be that due to a variety
of causes, a U.S. industry has suffered injury but the injury which is
properly attributable to the impact of dumped or subsidized goods is less
than material. In that situation the USITC would find injury, the Canadian Import Tribunal would not.
This discussion should make clear our differing concepts of cause or,
to use the older U.S. wording, by reason of. In our view, the Kennedy
6 Clearly, the most important legislative history is the Report of the Senate Finance Committee
on the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 which implemented the Tokyo Round agreements.
7 The determination of the Commission is found in Investigation No. 701-TA-265, USITC
PuB. No. 1911, at 23-24 (1986) (final determination).
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Round discussion about principal cause was based on a misconception,
and we did not take that concept into our law. We opted for the more
rigorous interpretation which we thought was consistent with Article VI
of the GATT and could not be inconsistent with the Code. We took-or
take-the view that the GATT requires that the injury found to be the
result of dumping (or subsidization), not including the injury due to
other factors, must be found to be material if duties are to be imposed.
The word material raises another, but closely related, issue. What
degree of adverse impact is suggested by that term? There is first, that
degree of injury which is clearly trifling, which should not be considered
by our two tribunals-this is a matter of settled law. Then, in my view,
there is that degree of injury which is less than that degree required to be
found to exist for the penalty duties to be imposed; that is injury which is
less than material but more than trifling (de minimis). Somewhat further
along this continuum there is that degree of injury which is serious, to
use the language of Article XIX, and of our law, and the existence of
which justifies (under the GATT)raising a bound rate of duty or imposing a quota. We should avoid the temptation to collapse serious into
material, and both into the category of not immaterial. I say this despite
the U.S. legislative history which is, by and large, a reflection of protectionist sentiments. 8
Our interpretation, and the plain meaning of the GATT provisions,
is based on the judgment that dumping and subsidization are very general and extensive phenomena; many firms dump and many firms are
subsidized. It follows that the anti-dumping and countervailing duty
provisions should be used only when it is clear that the imports at issue
are themselves the cause of severe harm. These provisions are measures
of last resort; if we both viewed them in that way, it would be easier to
work to a new multilateral or bilateral arrangement. In practical terms,
a more rigorous approach means agreeing on a clear definition of causation and a clear concept of injury. One possible approach, a more radical
one, is to sweep all anti-dumping, anti-subsidization, and escape clause
concepts together with one standard of injury and one clarified concept
of causation. I am aware that at least one distinguished member of the
U.S. trade bar has already suggested that this is the only way out of the
growing legalism and rampant protectionism of the anti-dumping and
countervailing duty systems.9 I predict that whatever approach is required, it is in this area that our bilateral negotiators will have the most
difficulty, and there must inevitably be some rethinking, some re-casting
of the roles of our two tribunals in regard to bilateral issues of this sort.
The intellectual and practical difficulties in the anti-dumping and
8 See Senate Finance Committee Report, supra note 6.
9 See N. Hemmendinger, Shifting Sands: An Examination of the PhilosophicalBasis for US.
Trade Laws, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY: THE LAWYER'S PERSPECTIVE (Jackson, Cun-

ningham & Fontheim eds. 1985).
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anti-subsidization area are very serious and raise real problems which
must be worked out. We must solve these problems to have a more effective multilateral regime, and a more open bilateral arrangement.
Take the issue of anti-subsidization measures and countervail in particular. The system sanctioned by GATT Article VI and the Tokyo
Round Code is employed by the United States, with considerable vigour
and frequency, more than by Canada. It is not at all clear from the record under the U.S. Trade Agreements Act that the acceptance by the
United States of an injury test for countervail has in fact significantly
limited the scope for countervailing duty application. Rather the reverse;
having accepted an injury test, the Congress, the Administration, and the
trade bar have assumed that any U.S countervailing duty proceeding
must be acceptable, and the system be deployed without question. But
there are the difficulties created by the definitions of injury, material and
causality to which I have already referred; there is the problem that subsidies are not defined in net terms-that is, we ignore costs imposed on
producers by government programs which subsidies may merely offset.
The countervailing duty provisions and the anti-dumping duty provisions
have thus become overtly protectionist rather than being a legitimate
remedy for injurious unfair practices.
It will be important, as we try to work out the roles of our two
tribunals in the emerging competitive economies of North America, that
we make some effort to see these matters from the point of view of the
other country. In the United States, countervailing duty is an effective
device, under domestic law, for getting at imports. It is true that a country which feels aggrieved by the results of that proceeding can take part
in the domestic process and can make representations to the U.S. government, and can even proceed to invoke the GATT conciliation and dispute settlement procedure. But this is not likely to prevent real damage
being done to the interests of a small country heavily dependent on exports by the improper or misconceived use of countervail. But take the
reverse case: if a country such as Canada countervails against a large
entity, such as the United States or the EEC, the economic impact on
producers in that larger entity is likely to be minimal, as compared with
the damage done to producers in the smaller economy by the protectionist actions of a larger entity. Moreover, the larger economy has a range
of possible bargaining counters or techniques for applying pressure to the
smaller economy which the smaller more open, more dependent economy does not have in relation to the larger. Most of us are aware of how
aggressive and threatening the U.S. agricultural interests (and the U.S.
Secretary of Agriculture) have been in relation to the Canadian use of the
countervailing duty provisions; although it appears to me, speaking informally, that my colleagues in the Department of National Revenue, in
calculating U.S. subsidies are at least as meticulous and conservative in
their methods as are U.S. Commerce Department officials. We are also
aware how belligerent and threatening the EEC authorities have been in
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regard to Canadian use of countervail, including references to retaliation,
which is, of course, not contemplated under the GATT rules in regard to
a properly conducted countervail proceeding. In summary, what we see,
is essentially an assymmetry in the use of countervail; it is an effective
protective device for a large economy, but not for a smaller economy.
This alone should be sufficient reason for treating countervail as a
weapon of last resort and require, therefore, the use of rigorous criteria.
There is another form of asymmetry in countervail which must be
understood and addressed in the forthcoming multilateral negotiation of
the GATT Codes, and certainly in the bilateral discussions. That is the
fact that there exists no remedy under domestic legal provisions for those
damaging subsidies which make possible domestic production displacing
otherwise competitive imports. There is no domestic law provision
equivalent to countervail available to a Canadian firm which finds it can
no longer export to the United States without dumping or accepting a
subsidy because new U.S. production has been created by virtue of some
U.S. subsidy, perhaps at the state level, perhaps through the demise of
industrial revenue bonds. It may be that these domestic U.S. subsidy
programs, including those through the tax system, which have favoured
capital-intensive industries are now being cut back; if so, well and good
because Canadian firms find it difficult to compete with U.S. state and
Federal treasuries. But there are all the facilities, with many years of
productive life ahead, which were built in the United States with the aid
of subsidies. There is no effective remedy comparable to countervail for
producers injured by such practices; true, under the Tokyo Round Code
our government can go to Geneva and enter into a dispute. But clearly
this is a feeble process as compared to a countervail proceeding.
This asymmetry, in the range of measures and remedies available as
against damaging subsidies, is a good and a sufficient reason for using
countervail sparingly and only in cases where intolerable damage is being
done.
In a revised system, either within a bilateral arrangement or under
multilateral auspices, there might well be roles for our two tribunals in
assessing the impact on our domestic producers of an import-replacing
subsidy in the other country. Clearly the investigative methods and the
procedures developed under the existing rules could be adopted to such a
purpose. I do, however, see one difficulty about such an approach. In
our Canadian circumstance, U.S. subsidies, such as industrial revenue
bonds, may have encouraged Canadian-controlled firms to establish U.S.
producing affiliates rather than expand production in Canada. In such
cases, we might find that there is no Canadian firm willing to come forth
to make a claim that it has suffered injury. Of course, in such a situation
it is the economy as a whole which has suffered an injury or, to use the
GATT concepts in Article XVI, it is the interests of a contracting party
which have suffered a serious prejudice.
Looking beyond these questions of imbalance, asymmetry and inad-
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equacies in the basic structure of countervail, and as compared with the
absence of effective remedies for a range of injurious subsidization practices other than those that are caught by countervail, there is the increasingly serious question of what constitutes a subsidy, and what sort of
subsidy should be actionable. I am aware that some discussion has gone
on between experts under the aegis of the GATT, but, as I understand it,
the discussions have not done more than identify major issues.
In addressing this issue, as in addressing many of the issues in this
paper, I am obviously going far beyond the narrow range of issues which
fall under my direct scrutiny in the Canadian Import Tribunal, and I can
speak only personally and without the benefit of having had to assist in
making decisions. But it does seem to me that the U.S. administration
(that is, the officials in the Department of Commerce) have done a thorough job in classifying a range of practices as countervailable or not (I
have in mind particularly the various steel cases) but it may be that in so
doing they were required, under the law, to exercise too much zeal. The
key issue is one I have already referred to: subsidies are not defined in
net terms.
Another major definitional issue with regard to subsidies to be discussed and, one may hope, agreed upon, is the issue of natural resources
allocation programs. In many countries particular resources are not only
regulated as to their exploitation by the state, they are also owned by the
state. When Article VI of the GATT was drafted, was it seriously contemplated that the allocation of a natural resource by some method other
than an arm's length auction would be deemed to be a countervailable
subsidy? I think the answer is clearly no. Moreover, our negotiators in
the Tokyo Round never had it suggested to them that natural resource
allocation techniques, if they resulted in a less than auction price for the
resource, could be countervailed. To make such a proposal would be
(and, with regard to lumber, has been) to use the countervailing duty
provisions, not against a subsidy, but against a comparative advantage.
A sovereign government's allocation of its minerals, timber, water, airspace, fish, or use of territorial waters is an exercise of sovereignty.
There is nothing in the GATT history, let alone the GATT text, which
suggests that such a sovereign power must be limited to auction pricing if
it is not to be countervailed. Indeed, this is the argument which one of
your Assistant Secretaries of Commerce put to a Subcommittee of your
[Senate] Finance Committee several years ago.1" The U.S. authorities
10 ForestProductsindustry Issues: Joint HearingBefore the House Subcomm. on International
Trade, the House Subcomm. on Taxation and Debt Management and the Senate Comm. on Finance,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1981) (Testimony of Lawrence J. Brady, Assistant Secretary for Trade
Administration in the Department of Commerce).
"A countervailable subsidy in this context exists where different purchasers in the exporting country
are charged different, preferential prices. The fact that a country provides goods or services at a fee
lower than the world market price or U.S. price, does not mean it has conferred a countervailable
benefit. "Low prices or price ceilings placed on a natural resource, such as stumpage, do not neces-

CANADA-UNITED

STATES LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 12:195 1987

apparently found it convenient to change their view when there was pressure to get at imports of Canadian lumber. In my view, and I have not,
of course, been a participant in any of the relevant discussions, the precedent in U.S. law created by the lumber case cannot be accepted. That is
not to say that resource allocation projects cannot be manipulated, or
distorted, or used as a cover to provide a countervailable subsidy; that is
the other side of the issue which we must surely resolve in multilateral
discussion and, of course, in any bilateral arrangement.
To put the issue starkly, we cannot be expected to accept a system,
taken to be sanctioned by the GATT, in which the U.S. changes the rules
according to domestic political pressures.
Clearly, there is ahead for our two countries a long and difficult
discussion of what is a subsidy, how the size of the subsidy is to be calculated, and what subsidies may be countervailed or otherwise give rise to a
cause of action. But this will be the more manageable if we together
work out a meaningful concept of injury, of causability, and of the degree
of injury at issue, fully consistent with the GATT provisions. I do not
see in this any suggestion that either Canada or the United States would
not be able to act expeditiously against damaging subsidization of imports. It is, of course, in regard to the creation of more meaningful, more
realistic and more economically justifiable standards of injury and causality that the USITC and the Canadian Import Tribunal have a major role
to play in the competitive economies of North America.
The current style in which the anti-dumping provisions are deployed
also raises issues. My remarks about injury, the degree of injury, and
about causality obviously apply equally to the anti-dumping system as to
countervail and indeed, as I hope I have made clear, to so-called escapeclause or safeguard actions under GATT Article XIX. But in regard to
the anti-dumping system there is the increasingly serious issue of the
widening gap, in concepts and standards employed, between the antidumping system and the relevant provisions of law regarding transactions in domestic commerce. (Perhaps I should note, parenthetically,
that we do not have provisions in domestic law-which would surely not
be irrelevant in federal states-to provide a remedy for a producer insarily constitute a subsidy under U.S. law. This is because a natural resource may be considered a
free good. The government need not be concerned with prices if it incurs no costs which must then
be recovered. For example, we have insisted that the European Community not regard our natural
gas price controls as a countervailable subsidy. Each country may utilize its natural resources to
give it a comparative advantage in the market for certain products, in order to maximize benefits to
the general development of the economy of that country.
"With respect to stumpage, countervailable preferential pricing would result from a refusal to sell
stumpage to a given type of firm which otherwise meets reasonable requirements such as minimum
capitalization and/or production levels, and the clearing of debris and other forms of land recovery.
For example, allocating only to firms on the basis of export performance or allocating on better
terms to one industry than to another." (Forest ProductsIndustry Issues: Joint Hearing,Sub-conmn.
on International Trade and Subcomm. on Taxation and Debt Management, Senate Conin. on Finance, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 21 (Nov. 24, 1981)).
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jured by the effect of a subsidy paid to another producer in the same
country. Given the importance of provincial and state subventions in our
two countries, one could argue that this is an interesting omission. A
U.S tire producer can get a countervailing duty imposed in regard to
Canadian provincial government subsidization of steel-belted radial tires,
but another Canadian producer has no comparable remedy for the injury
he suffers as a result of subsidized competition in the domestic market. It
apears to be only the EEC which is trying to deal with this issue between
member states. In any event, under the GATT we envisage punitive duties against one category of goods, imports, although there is no
equivalent provision in regards to domestic commerce. It follows that
countervail is uniquely a protective mechanism.) But the anti-dumping
system was supposed to be, at least in the United States, if I read the
history correctly, 1 the counterpart of legislation directed at injurious
price discrimination or predatory pricing in domestic commerce. Such
legislation exists in the United States and Canada, but over time it and
the anti-dumping provisions have diverged substantially.'" Both in Canada and the United States, we see anti-dumping action taken against imports in situations where, to say the least, it is not clear that action would
be taken in comparable situations in domestic commerce. Here there is
clearly a very difficult issue for our bilateral negotiations. If we were to
set aside anti-dumping measures, with regard to transactions as between
Canada and the United States, as part of a broad bilateral arrangement,
what could be done about price discrimination in such transaction?
Would a U.S. producer have a right to proceed in a U.S. court or a Canadian court, under our competition law, for protection against a U.S. firm
dumping in Canada? There are other questions which will have to be
addressed. What about dumping by third countries using one country in
the pre-trade arrangement as a pass-through? Clearly, this is a complex
administrative issue rather than a conceptual one. A more interesting
issue will be whether one would contemplate giving a producer in one
country, say the United States, the right to invoke Canadian law against
dumping in Canada by a third country. This would not be inconsistent
with the GATT, which does contemplate such proceedings. I reiterate
that I am not party to the bilateral discussions on these matters; I can
only assume that they are being addressed.
Clearly, if such new arrangements are worked out, there may be new
or redefined roles for our two tribunals as regards bilateral trade.
Before I go on to address, as a final topic, the issue of trade policy
dispute settlement between our two countries and the possible role, if
II See JACOB VINER: DumPING/A PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE, (reprintedby Kelley 1966).
12 See Rodney de C. Grey, Trade Policy and the System of Contingency Protection in the
Perspective of Competition Policy, (Feb. 18, 1986) (paper prepared for Working Party No. 1 of the
OECD Committee of Experts on Restrictions Business Practices).
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any, of our two tribunals in regard to such issues, there are two matters I
should mention.
The first is procedures. I have commented on matters of substance-injury, causation, the scope of countervail, and so forth. But
there is also the question of our procedures. I have long admired the
high standard of the reports issued by the ITC, although not always entirely agreeing with the conclusions reached by the Commissioners; that
may be due to how the key concept of injury and causality are read in
U.S. law and precedent, and in Senate Committee reports. I have the
impression that, by and large, the USITC relies more on the investigative
work of the staff than do we in the Import Tribunal, and that we attach
more weight to what emerges in the submissions of the parties and in the
public hearings. That is why we provide for cross-examination of witnesses in our hearings in anti-dumping cases (and in other types of hearings) and that is why our determinations cannot be fully assessed without
examining the submission of the parties and the transcripts of the hearings. Our determinations are not, and are not intended to be, detailed
comprehensive reports, but only statements of findings and the reasons
therefore.
Another procedural difference is that we do not have a full system of
preliminary determinations, at least by the Import Tribunal. Under our
system, the agency responsible for investigating whether there is dumping or subsidization must be satisfied that there is sufficient evidence of
injury. But the issue may be referred to the Tribunal by the investigating
agency, importers, exporters, foreign governments, or, if an application is
rejected by the investigating agency, by the producers concerned. The
fact that we are not required to make preliminary determinations in all
cases has kept our workload manageable and, with the safeguards I have
referred to, has kept the procedural requirements for the parties within
reasonable limits.
So much for differences in procedures. Let me note one interesting
development which may suggest a wider role for the Import Tribunal,
and may be a hint of what might be contemplated as a result fo our
multilateral arrangements or under a bilateral arrangement. When Canada was revising its legislation consequent to the Tokyo Round, a provision was enacted allowing the Government to direct the Tribunal "to
inquire into and report ...in relation to ...the provision, by persons
normally resident out of Canada, of services in Canada that may cause or
threaten injury to, or that may retard, the provision of services in Canada
by persons normally resident in Canada." 3 This section has not yet been
made use of; however, it is clear that, as both Canada and the United
States are service economies, and as there is now considerable trade in
services, there will be need for a mechanism of enquiry into allegations
that imports are causing unacceptable damage to domestic producers. It
13

Special Import Measures Act, supra note 3, s. 48.
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is likely that the role of our two tribunals will be expanded in the direction of services as rules about services trade are negotiated.
Finally, I turn to an issue which is no doubt receiving some attention in the bilateral trade policy discussions. That issue is, how to handle
trade policy disputes which may arise between Canada and the United
States, particularly those that are covered by some new agreement. It is
not entirely clear that the USITC or the Canada Import Tribunal should
or could necessarily have a role in the settlement of such disputes. In the
main, our two tribunals deal with aspects of the system of providing remedies or relief for private parties in regard to the actions of other private
parties. If either government decides that the action resulting from one
of our findings is not consistent with the GATT, it is the GATT machinery which is employed, not our two tribunals. Similarly, if there is a
dispute as between our two governments under some new bilateral arrangement, the issue could be put to some sort of institution comparable
in function to the GATT machinery, or comparable to the Canada/U.S.
International Joint Commission. It would not be difficult to devise some
such arbitral or adjudicatory body. The key question will be not how to
set up such a body, because there are many models, but whether or not
our governments will accept to be bound by their decisions, or will take
their findings merely as advice.
It would be a different, and more difficult, matter to devise a Canada/U.S. body to which private parties would have direct access. Such
an arrangement makes sense in the EEC, where there is a body of supranational law. Perhaps some sort of body could be constituted to which
private parties would have access if they wish to state a case that the
bilateral treaty is being abrogated; but this is difficult to envisage unless
we accept the notion of private parties acting against the other national
government. I do not myself see that such an arrangement is necessary;
what will be needed is a bilateral mechanism for settling disputes between governments. In that context, our two tribunals may have no role
except, of course, that their determinations may be subject to scrutiny in
such a new institution.

